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Unions and Equal Employment Opportunity
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes differences in the growth ofminority and female
employment between union and non-union manufacturing plants inCalifornia
during the late l970's, In this sector, unionized plants donot exhibit any
more gross employment discrimination than do non—unionplants against black or
Hispanic men, or against black or white women, despite therecessions of the
1970's that displaced low seniority workers. Black malesactually enjoy faster
growth of employment share in unionized plants,suggesting that Title vii has
been effective in increasing opportunities for blacks.This may help explain
why unionization, though decreasing in the privatesector, has been increasing
among blacks. The role played by unions in mediating affirmative action
regulations is also examined.
There are significant differences across particularunions, especially
between craft and industrial unions, within industries thatcorrespond with
each union's public record on EEO. Black employment increasesmost rapidly in
industries with a long history of black employment, inplants organized by
unions that take a liberal position towards EEO, and in industrieswith a large
union wage effect. As least in Californiamanufacturing during this period,
the belief that unions have hindered minority and femaleemployment does not
seem to hold true for industrial unions.
Jonathan 5. Leonard
350 Barrows Hall
Schools of Business Administration
University of California at Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720How harmful or helpful have unions been to theemployment interests of minori-
ties and females? In the political sphere, the AFL-CIO has oftenjoined with blacks and
females in a familiar coalition. In the workplace, thesegroups have not been able to
forge a unity of interest. Open conflicts, including litigation and demonstrations, have
often emerged at the local level.
This paper asks one main question: what impact have unions hadon the employ-
ment of minorities and females in manufacturing? To determine whetherminority and
female employment has been helped or hindered by unionism, thechange during the
late 1970's in the employment of male and female Hispanics, blacks, whites andAsians
is compared across union and non-union plants.
Two secondary issues are also addressed. First, how have unionsmediated
affirmative action pressure? The success of federal policies to improveemployment
opportunities for minorities and females depends not only on theresponse of
employers, as this problem has usually been modeled, but also on that of unions. The
study of the impact of federal anti-discrimination and affirmative action regulation is
still young, and has yet to seriously address the role played by unions inmediating
regulatory pressure1. Union seniority provisions came into sharp conflict with equal
employment opportunity policy during the stagnant seventies. While this provoked
many anecdotes and law cases, the actual impact on employment of this conflict
involving federal, corporate, and union policy has never been studied with the atten-
tion it deserves.
Second, why has unionization increased so dramaticallyamong blacks at the
same time that private sector unionism is in decline? The study design here isolates
from the confounding eflects of regional, industry or establishment growth,directly
controls for affirmative action pressure, and attempts to separate individual union,
establishment and demographic group effects in explaining this growth.
This study analyzes a new and detailed longitudinal set of data on 1273 California-2-
manufacturing establishments between 1974 and 1980. Theethnic diversity of this
state provides informative contrasts across Hispanics, Asians, blacksand whites. The
analysis proceeds in five stages. First, we establish the expectedroles played by
unions, firms, demographic groups, and the government within theframework of a
model of the supply and demand for union and non-union labor. Second, weestimate
the mean difference in demographic changes in employment betweenunion and non-
union plants using both T-tests across means and weighted log-odds regressions,and
find that in the late 1970's blacks' employment share increases fasterin the union
sector. Third, to isolate a general proclivity toward unionism amongminorities or
females from the behavior of unions themselves, we exploit the distributionof unions
across establishments and industries to estimatedifferences across individual unions
in minority and female employment growth. Fourth, to test for spilloverand omitted
variable bias, employment patterns among white-collar workers are alsostudied. The
interaction of affirmative action with unionism is analyzed in the fifth section,and our
conclusions are summarized in the final section.
The goal here is to open a new level of empirical research on the questionof the
impact of unionization on minority and female employment.The central finding is
that unions have not been a significant detriment to the employment ofminorities or
females.
Section 1. Background
Why should the unionized sector in manufacturing be anydifferent than its non-
union counterpart in its employment of Hispanics, blacks, Asians, andwomen? In
broadest terms, there are four major actors whose policies and preferences areof
immediate concern. These are the unions, the companies, the demographic groups,
and the federal government. In this section, we shall first place each of these actors
within a model of minority and female employment, and then proceed to discuss their
expected roles.-3-
The demand for labor may usefully be thought of as:
L=f(USF5,D,w5) (1)
where
=demandfor labor of demographic group jbyfirm i
U =unionization
S =skillrequirements
F =federalanti-discrimination and affirmative action pressure
D =firmtastes for discrimination
W =wage






This model is presented chiefly to structure the following discussion ofexpected
impact and paths. We shall return to it again at the end of this section to setup
empirical tests that isolate union, demographic group, establishment, and government
e tTe ct s.
The Role of Unions
The first impulse is to ascribe diflerences between the union and non-unionsec-
tors to the policies and practices of the unions themselves. The most obviousway
unions can aect the demographic composition of the workforce is bydirectly-4-
controlling hiring. The key distinction here is between craft andindustrial unions, or
more precisely and tautologically, between referral andnon-referral unions. Under
Landrum-Griffin, construction unions have what is in practice a closed shop with the
union often controlling who may be hired. The broad scope this gives to discrimina-
tion is revealed in studies which show evidence of discrimination against blacksin the
unionized construction trades, but not in other unionized occupations. As the history
of the construction, longshoring, maritime and printing trades shows, the legal res-
trictions on unions control of hiring are not always honored in practice. InCalifornia
manufacturing, typically thought of as non-referral, it is not uncommonto find
modified referral clauses in collectively bargained contracts. Typically, the company
agrees to notify the union first when a job opens2.The question of referral practices
in the unions is an empirical one that cannot be resolved by reference to contractual
provisions or labor law. While the substantial differences betweenconstruction craft
unions and others is universally acknowledged, there is no evidence that rulesout the
power of unions in the manufacturingsector to influence the hiring decisions of
employers.
If, as seems reasonable, we grant the unions in manufacturing some influence,
then their attitudes become important, and these attitudes are strongly shaped by
circumstances3. To bargain effectively an industrial union must organize enough of
its industry to reduce the elasticity of demand. for union labor. Unionsfaced with an
industry employing substantial numbers of blacks or females have typicallyfound it in
their hearts to take a more liberal stand toward the employment and organizingof
such potential competitors. (Ashenfelter 1973, Fogel, Marshall). But these cross-
industry patterns cannot easily explain the relative prevalence of blacks,for example,
in union plants within an industry. Differences are relative, so an egalitarianunion
may appear angelic next to a discriminatingnon-union sector. But the historical
record shows unions following, and forced to adapt to the relative lack of discrimina--5-
tion in the non-union sector. (Marshall, Fogel).
Seniority is one of the ruling principles of industrial unionism. It is well known
that quit rates are much lower in the union sector, inresponse to strong seniority
benefits, high compensation, and the union voice mechanism. (Block, Freeman). This
in itself will tend to freeze the workforce and slow the entry ofany previously discrim-
inated against group, a point we shall return to in Section 5. So even in the absence of
current discrimination, we would expect minorities and females to make slowerpro-
gress in increasing their share of employment in the union sector.
Since 1965 the courts have often struggled with the problem raised by facially
neutral seniority systems that lock in the effects of past discrimination. The conflict
between union seniority clauses and federal anti-discrimination and affirmative action
policy has been painfully exposed by recent recessions when last-in first-out union
seniority clauses have helped undo years of federal pressure to increase minority and
female employment. The problem has been exacerbated by the unionized sector's ten-
dency to resort to layoffs during a downturn. (Medoff). The Supreme Court in its 1977
Teamsters decision overruled a series of lower court decisions in which senioritysys-
tems had come under attack for freezing out a generation of blacks.4 This rulinggave
greater weight to Section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, largely insulating
seniority units that are created and administered in a non-discriminatory fashion
from charges of locking in pre-1965 discrimination. An employer who might be suc-
cessfully sued under Title VII for his low representation of females or minorities is
largely immunized from such suit if this underrepresentation is due to the functioning
of a seniority system that has been non-discriminatory in intent and administration
since 1965.
We would expect then that during the late seventies minorities and females would
make smaller employment gains in the union sector, both because union senioritysys-
tems reduce workforce turnover, and because such systems tend to insulate the firm-6-
from Title VII damages.
Unions' attitudes toward minorities and females may also be influenced by their
desire to maintain one rate of pay for each job no matter who holds it, and by the con-
tingencies of liberal coalition politics at the national level. But it is a long road down
to the locals, which respond more closely to their own local problems than to the
noble words of their national leaders. (Marshall). While the nationals have some con
cern with maintaining the union's share of an industry, the locals have typically taken
a more exclusionary stand.
The Role of the Federal Government
The protection afforded unionized plants under Section 703(h) of Title VII has
already been noted. The other arm of federal policy in this arena is affirmative action
regulation under Executive Order 11246 and its successors. This pressure is directed
towards federal contractors, not directly against unions in the manufacturing sector.
The legal limits of such compulsion are largely circumscribed by reference to Title VTI,
so the same judicial interpretations that immunize unionized establishments under
Title VII tend also to insulate them from affirmative action pressure.
Unionized establishments are more likely than their non-union counterparts to
be federal contractors in the study sample. A more important finding is that among
contractors, union plants are not any more likely to undergo a compliance review, the
chief affirmative action enforcement procedure. While there are major cases in the
past of the government setting out after construction unions, most notably in the Phi-
ladelphia Plan and its progeny, the government appears to be largely neutral between
the union and non-union sectors of manufacturing.
The Employers
There seems little reason to expect unionized employers to act dierently, ceteris
paribus, in their employment of minorities and females for reasons other than theindirect influence of the unions or the government mentioned above,or the direct
impact of the union wage effect. Unions have been estimated to raisewages by 15to
20 percent in the manufacturing sector, (Lewis). This will tend to reduceemployment
in the unionized sector and may work against minorities or females inhiring if they
are less skilled. But it is not clear that these groups are any less productive than
whites in ways that are material to manufacturing. (Leonard). In addition, unionized
plants tend to be larger, and are more likely to be part of a multi-plant corporation.
These two factors, along with the fact of unionization itself, contribute tomore for-$
malized personnel procedures that may reduce discrimination.
Demographic Group Differences
The relative employment of blacks may be greater in the union sector than in the
non-union sector not because of the preferences of the unions, thegovernment, or
the employers, but rather because of the preferences of blacks themselves. Ina
number of studies during the 1970's, blacks are reported to have muchstronger
preferences than whites for unions. (Farber and Saks, Freeman and Medoff, Kochan).
The evidence is less clear on preferences among women and Hispanics. This neednot
imply that blacks have different utility functions, but rather that blacks face a
different set of constraints and so value unions more highly. It is in this lattersense
that preferences shall be referred to here. This preference is usually attributed to
the relative freedom from discrimination afforded blacks and others by unions'egali-
tarian policies. For example, a recent study found no evidence of a racial differential
in the impact of unions on opportunities for occupational advance or on job tenure.
(Leigh, 1979). This explanation must be tempered by the abundant litigation charging
unions with maintaining discriminatory seniority units, although it cannot be denied
that unions tend to protect workers from arbitrary treatment at the hands of the
employer. Both the NLRB and the courts have upheld the responsibility of unions as
exclusive bargaining agents to fairly represent minority and female employees. The-8-
relative egalitarianism of the union sector has probably diminished over time as condi-
tions have improved in the non-union sector. Recent studies of racial wage discrimi-
nation in CPS samples find that the difference between the union and non-union sec-
tor has narrowed, largely because of the overriding equalizing force of Title VII. (Free-
man and Medoff).
Of greater importance perhaps in explaining black preferences is the union wage
effect. in 1967, this was greater for black males and for white females than for white
males, although black females lagged behind the others. (Ashenfelter, 1973). At this
time, black males and white females had more to gain from working in a union plant.
The higher return for blacks among experienced men is still observed when probabil-
ity of selection into the union sample is controlled for. (Leigh, 1980). During the 1974
recession, as the union wage effect for white males increased, this difference nar-
rowed. The ratio of black male to white male union wage effects dropped from a
remarkable 2.24 in 1967 to 1.38 in 1975. (Ashenfelter, 1979). Just as striking, during
this stagnant period for white male unionization, the proportion of black males org an-
ized increased from .32 in 1965 to .37 in 1975, and the proportion of black females
unionized increased from .13 to .22. (Ashenfelter, 1979). The substantial increase in
black unionization is concentrated between 1970 and 1975, and cannot be explained
by changes in the distribution of blacks across occupations or industries. (1-loizer).
This growth may give some measure of the strong impact of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in allowing blacks to realize their preferences in the job market, a ques-
tion we hope to shed some light on here.
Empirical Strategy
To summarize these countervailing forces briefly, the question to be addressed
empirically in the next section is whether blacks' stronger preferences for unions
outweighs the impact of unions in slowing change in the composition of the workforce.
The government's role is expected to be essentially neutral across sectors, and is-9-
directly controlled for since we know whichestablishments are federal contractors
subject to affirmative action, and which haveundergone a compliance review. Bias due
to the possible impact of individualestablishment effects is guardedagainst in two
ways. First, all regressions control for pastestablishment employment patterns, and
so essentially difference out time invariantindividual effects. Secondly white-collar
employment patterns in which the unions havelittle say, are compared to blue-collar
patterns, with the difference attributed tounions. Union effects, as distinct froma
generalized preference for unions byany particular demographic group, are tested
both by differentiating the unionimpact on blacks, Hispanics, and females;and by
estimating the impact of individual unions.
Section 2. Unions andtheEmployment of Hispanics, Blacks, and Females
Unionized establishments exhibitstrikingly different employment patterns than
non-unionized establishments in thesame industry and SMSA. In light of the factthat
unions in the manufacturing sectorcannot legally control hiring and inlight of the
prevalent view that they do not directly influencehiring, this is a remarkable finding
made more so by the direction of the effect.
Table 1 presents T-tests of theequality across union and non-union establish-
ments of the levels and changes in the racialand sexual composition of the blue-collar
workforce between 1974 and 1980 ina longitudinal sample of 1273 Californiamanufac-
turing establishments with at least one hundredemployees each. The characteristics
and construction of this newsample are described in the appendix.
Unionized establishments start out in1974 with a higher representation of black
males, 6.6% compared to 4.9% for thenon-union establishments. Moreimportantly,
black males' employment sharegrows faster in the union sector5. It reaches 7.7% in
1980, compared to 5.3%among the non-unionized. The rate of change inmeans is 17
percent in the union sector in just sixyears, far greater than the 6 percent in the
flOfl-Ufljon sector. The mean rates ofchange in both sectors are even greater,- 10-
suggestingthat growth in employment share has been relatively greaterwhere that
share was initially low6.
Comparing the changes in employment patterns ofblack males to that of Hispanic
males, black females, or Hispanic females warns thatthere can be no simple monol-
ithic explanation of the higher level and faster growth rateof black male employment
share in the union sector. Whatever process preferentiallysorts black males into
union jobs has not similarly affected black females, Hispanicmales, or Hispanic
females.
Hispanic males do start out with higher representationin the union sector but
faster non-union growth renders this difference insignificant by1980. Female Hispan-
ics are initially significantly more heavily representedin non-union jobs, and this
differential grows over time. Black females also start out with greateremployment
share in the non-union sector, but their growth ratesdo riot differ significantly across
sectors. In both sectors, the greatest proportional employment gainsare enjoyed by
Asians of both sexes, because they begin with such smallshares. Asian growth has
been significantly greater in the non-union sector. It is alsoremarkable that between
1974 and 1980 whites lost their majority position in Californiamanufacturing. Their
share dropped by 21 percent from .61 to .48 of blue-collar employment.White females
share fell faster in the non-union sector. For white males,there is no significant
difference in the decline across sectors.
It is important to note that total employment has not increasedin the union sec-
tor, although smaller plants have grown. Absolute minorityand female employment in
this sector has grown while white male employment has clec].ined.This finding stands
out in view of the commonly held belief about the impact of union seniorityladders on
minority and female employees. Last-in first-out would be expectedto reduce minor-
ity and female share during a recession becausethese groups typically have lower
seniority than white males. The explanation may simply bethat California manufac--11-
turing did not suffer from a great recessionbetween 1974 and 1980. In thestudy sam-
ple, employment in the union sectorwas stable. According to the Departmentof
Labor, total employment in Californiamanufacturing increased by 18 percent between
1974 and 1980, with an insignificantdecline between 1979 and 1980, anda 6 percent
decline between 1974 and 1975.(Employment and Training Report of thePresident
1981, Table d-2, p. 230).
California serves as a strongwarning against the facile identification ofminority
with black. Hispanics are thelargest minority group in California, onstituting38 per-
cent of blue-collar employment inmanufacturing in 1980. This compares with black's
9 percent and Asians' 8percent, and is not far behind white's 48percent. Moreover,
Hispanics have grown the fastest,increasing their share fully 10 percentagepoints in
just six years from .28 in 1974. Thissharp growth has not been accommodated
without conflict. The California StatePresident of the Mexican-AmericanPolitical
Association, Julio Calderon, has said that the:
"[Civil Rights movement] has pitted theblack community against the
Mexican-American community. Thismay be unspeakable, but to deny that it
exists is to put blinders on oneself" (OaklandTribune 3/24/83 p. A-14)
It must at once be recalled that thedominant pattern we find here is an increase
in Hispanic share and acorresponding decrease in white share, alongsidea smaller
increase in black share.
Log-Odds Estimates
The basic results found in themeans above stand up well in more rigorous tests.
The definitions and sample statisticsof the variables used in this analysisare given in
Table 2. Table 3 presents ourcentral regression results. Theseare estimates of log-
odds models, weighted by theestablishment's total blue-collar employment,and con-
trolling for past employment share, twoor three digit SIC industry, SMSA, and theper-
cent of blue-collar workers whoare craft workers. The essential findings hereare in- 12-
generalnot significantly changed by weighting. These regressions alsocontrol for
establishment size and growth rate, and whether or not the establishment wasunion-
ized, part of a multi-plant company, a federal contractor subjectto affirmative action
in 1974, or reviewed for compliance with affirmative action between1974 and 1980.
With these extensive and detailed controls, black male sharestill increases
significantly faster in the union sector. As can be seenin equation 2 of Table 3, this
difTerence of 1.3 percentage points is not small. It amounts to 19 percentof their ini-
tial share.
The relative size of the union impact here can best be appreciated by comparing
it with that of affirmative action. Equation 2 also shows thatthe increase in black
male employment share is significantly larger among federalcontractors subject to
affirmative action, and among contractors that are reviewed forcompliance7. The
impact of unionization is just slightly less thanthat of undergoing a compliance
review, and actually greater than that of being a federalcontractor. Before entering
into the question of causality, it is remarkable that in the caseof California manufac-
turing unionization appears to act as a more powerfulaffirmative action program for
black males than does the federal affirmative action program itself.
It has often been argued that black males' employment is limited bytheir lack of
skills. It is then worth noting that in this sample their share ofblue-collar employ-
ment among all males has increased most in craft-intensivework-forces. In addition,
the overall importance of growth in facilitating the entry ofminorities and females
into manufacturing can be seen in the significant negative impactof establishment
growth on white male employment, a summary measure.
In contrast to the faster increase in black male employment in theunion sector,
unionization has had no significant impact on Hispanic male employment, nor onthat
of black females, white females, or Asian males8. If black males' improved employment
under unionism were due only to blacks' attitudes toward unions or proximityto13 -
unionizedestablishments, or to unionized establishments' employmentpractices, one
might reasonably expect similar patterns among blacks of bothsexes, but we find no
significant evidence of such a pattern for black females. Black malesnot only differ
from black females, they also differ from Hispanic males. Thetheory of discrimination
that explains why predominantly white unionized establishmentsshould favor the
employment of black males, while treating Hispanic males indifferently atbest, cannot
be a simple one9.
The salient finding in this section is that black maleemployment share has
increased faster in the union sector. In the following sectionswe turn to questions of
causality and attempt to determine how much of this difference can beexplained by
union policy, or by differences in employer or government behavioracross sectors.
Section 3. Differences Across Unions
Unions are not undifferentiated in either their attitudesor their policies toward
affirmative action, or in their actual minority and femalemembership. Because many
large unions have organized plants across a number of industries, and becausemost
industries have been organized by a number of unions, it ispossible to separate out
the impact of individual unions. If there were no significant differencesacross unions
once industry, SMSA, and plant occupational structure were controlled for, that would
constitute strong evidence that the swifter expansion of black male employmentshare
in the unionized sector was primarily due to black males'stronger preference for
union jobs, rather than to any policy or practice ofany individual unions. That does
not appear to be the case here. There are significant differences inminority and
female employment growth across unions that in a number ofcases correspond
closely to differences in these unions' public statements on discrimination and
affirmative action.
Here only the most striking cases can be alluded to. Union A,long noted for its
liberal stance, has been among the most outspoken proponents ofequal rights for- 14-
blacks.In contrast to most AFL unions, Union A accepted and integratedblacks into
existing locals as blacks entered this union's primary industry duringthe depression.
In these early years the union was among the pioneers in formally establishing an
internal fair employment practices department. While taking a strongstand on civil
rights at the national level, Union A has also been aco-defendant in a plethora of Title
VII litigation charging that it maintained discriminatory seniority laddersat the local
level. It would seem the union had reached only partial accommodationwith its black
members.
in 1982, Union A held contracts in eight dierent two-digit SIC industries inCali-
fornia manufacturing. Table 4 shows that both black and Hispanicmales have aug-
mented their share of blue-collar employment significantly more in the twenty-five
plants organized by Union A than in most other unionized plants.However discrimina-
tory union seniority ladders may have been, they havenot discouraged black or
Hispanic males from gaining employment. While the averageunion impact is to raise
black male employment share by 1.3 percentage points, the correspondingincrease in
plants organized by Union A is 2.8 percentage points.For Hispanic males the
diflerence is even greater. Their employment share grows slower, insignificantly,in
the union sector as a whole, but grows by 4.1 percentage pointsin Union A plants. In
fact, Union A is the only union with a significant positive impact on Hispanic employ-
ment. This reinforces the interpretation of these patterns as directlyinfluenced by
union policy rather than just reflecting ethnic group preferences.
Union B's history has been similar in many ways to Union A's. While blacks have
long been employed in large numbers in Union B' primary industry,the union has
been the target of a large number of Title VII cases charging discriminatory seniority
ladders. But once again, black male employment share has grown significantly faster,
by two percentage points, than elsewhere in the union sector.
One explanation advanced for blacks' strong preference for union employment is- 15-
thategalitarianism within most unions limits thescope for any discriminatory treat-
ment, including racial discrimination. The multitude of TitleVII charges concerning
discriminatory promotion ladders at both Union A and B wouldseem to belie this
thesis, but one must consider the alternative. Blacksmay prefer a unionized plant not
because discrimination is absent, but simply because itis weaker. Moreover, these
discrirninatory seniority systems have been frequently andsuccessfully attacked in
the courts since 1965. At the same time, members ofboth Union A and B are among
the most well paid industrial workers in America. Thesubstantial union wage efTect in
these unions are likely to be even larger for blacks, andmay well outweigh the finer
costs of occupational segregation within the plant. Betterto ride second class than to
walk.
While minority male employment gains at Union Acorrespond to the union's long
liberal history, Union C was prominently known before 1965for its racially segregated
locals. By the late seventies things had changed. Blackmale employment share in the
57 plants organized by Union C significantly increasedby 2.3 percentage points, more
than the average of other unions.
At the other extreme are a number of craft orientedunions in which minority and
female employment has fallen relative to other unionor non-union plants. The exclu-
sionary ethic of these unions appears to carry over and influenceemployment pat-
terns in manufacturing, where their referral rightsare not so strongly established.
The evidence here suggests that an importantpart of the explanation for the
observed patterns of minority and femaleemployrrient in general, and of the growth of
black male share in the union sector in particular, is to befound in the policies and
practices of individual unions. This stands out in the contrast betweenthe craft-
oriented unions which appear to retard minority and femaleemployment, and Union A
which increases black and Hispanic maleemployment share more so than do other
unions.- 16-
Section4. White Collar Workers in Unionized Establishments
Establishments hire both white and blue collar workers,but typically it is only the
blue collar workers who are unionized, a differencewhich will be exploited in this sec-
tion. This institutional fact allows us to testwhether the union effect found above is
really an establishment effect. Theestablishments that are unionized may differ in
some ways, such as location orskill requirements that are uncontrolled for,but
correlated with unionization. This is a priori unlikelybecause our controls are quite
detailed and include two or three digit SIC industry,SMSA, establishment size and
growth, and the proportion of craftworkers among the blue-collar. Nevertheless,it
cannot be entirely ruled out. While unionization mayinfluence blue-collar employ-
ment it is difficult to see how unionization initself can affect white-collar demograph-
ic s10.
It does. Black males share of white-collar jobsincreases significantly faster in
unionized establishments, as seen in Table 5. Tnabsolute terms the effect is small, less
than a quarter percentage point. However,relative to blacks males' 1974 share of 1.5
percent this is a substantial increase.The interpretation of this estimate is compli-
cated by the further findings in Table 5 that Hispanicmales' share also increases
significantly faster in the union sector,while white females share increases
significantly less11. The result for white-collarHispanic men may be due to stronger
affirmative action pressure in favor of Hispanic menin the union sector, particularly
for white-collar jobs.
Unionization affects white- collar employment demographicsboth directly and
indirectly through its impact on blue-collar demographics.The tests in Table 5 expli-
citly control for the indirect path by holdingfixed past blue-collar employment share.
In every case higher past blue-collar share is significantlycorrelated with subsequent
white-collar share. even conditioning on past white-collarshare, SMSA, and industry.
This suggests either strong spillover from blue-collarto white-collar or an omitted- 17-
variablesuch as proximity to minority neighborhoods.The spillover hypothesis iscon-
siderably strengthened by observing thesame pattern for females, who do not live in
ghettos. Taken together, this evidence ofspillover and tipping accords with theessen-
tially tribal model of the labor market thatinforms many of the arguments in favorof
affirmative action.
The tests in Table 5may then qualify the previous findings for black maleproduc-
tion workers because the union effectson white-collar demographics persisteven
when indirect paths through blue-collaremployment are controlled for. In other
words, black male employment share inunionized establishments has increased in
white-collar jobs as well as in blue-collarjobs. It is important to remember that the
union effect among white-collar workersis less than that among the blue-collar.
Nevertheless, it is possible that unionization iscorrelated with some Uncontrolled for
establishment characteristic that favors thegrowth and not simply the level, of black
male employment12.
This section has shown that unionizedestablishments not only employ more black
males in blue-collar jobs, to a lesser extentthey also employ more black males in
white-collar jobs. Part of this effectmay be accounted for by spillover from blue-
collar demographics, but part remains andmay suggest establishment specific effects.
Section 5. Unions and Affirmative Action
Under most circumstances, unions shouldretard the progress of minorities and
females under affirmative action forreasons that have much to do with unions but lit-
tie to do with current discrimination. It iswell known that unions reduce quits. Lower
turnover will in itself reduce the rate ofpenetration of minorities and females into the
workplace, as we shall now prove.
The change in stock is equal to hires lessterminations. This identity is:
B= B_1 +RH —Br
(3)- 18-
where
B =stockof blacks in year t
BH =totalnumber of blacks hired between t-1 and t
Br =totalnumber of blacks terminated between t-1 and t
This may also be expressed as:
PN=PN_1+IH—OT (4)
where
=blacks'share of employment stock in year t
=totalemployment stock in year t
I-I =blacks'share of hires
I=totalhires
T =blacks'share of terminations
o totalterminations
Dividing through by N gives the identity in share form:
Pt=XPti+aH—bT (5)
where
athe ratio of total hires to total end of year stock
b =theratio of total terminations to total end of year stock
N1
x= 1—oH-b
The annual change in share of stock is:





An increase in black's share of hiresor terminations has a greater impact on black's
share of stock the greater is the hireor termination rate respectively.
In theory the impact of affirmative actionon protected groups' share of flows and
stock could be hidden by disparate turnoverrates between union plants and non-
union plants. If a and b are both small (or ofsimilar magnitude), then A is close to 1
and A is close to 1. In this case P changesonly slowly from Pg_n. By the same token,
firms characterized by high turnover ratescan show large improvements in minorities'
and females' employment share withoutlarge changes in hiring and firing policy. Thus
if affirmative action requires equal efTortfrom all firms, rather than equal results,
then high turnover firms should be held tohigher employment goals along an adjust-
ment path13.
For our purposes here, the importantpoint to remember is that the senioritysys-
tems that are part and parcel of unionism will tendto freeze the workforce at a plant,
a fact which the Supreme Court in its 1977 Teamsters decisionhas come to accept.
When this is combined with the fact thatunionized employment did not grow in the
study sample, one would expect affirmative action toappear less successful in union-
ized establishments for two reasons that havenothing to do with discrimination: low
turnover and low growth.
On the other hand, we have alreadyseen that while other protected groups have
not progressed significantly faster in the unionsector, black males have. Black males
also start with a higher 1974 share in theunion sector. Similarly, while otherpro-
tected groups have not significantly benefitedfrom affirmative action in California
manufacturing, blacks have. One might then reasonablyexpect two such positives to
interact in a larger positive, but this wouldembody an oversimplified conception of2D -
howaffirmative action works.
The pressures under affirmative action are to remedyunderutilization of minori-
ties and females. If black males are relatively overrepresentedin the union sector,
affirmative action can act to increase black males'overall share while bringing no
direct pressure to bear in the union sector. Butof course, with a limited supply of
blacks, the non-union sector's gain may well be theunion sector's loss. This is espe-
cially likely to occur if at the same time Hispanics arerelatively underrepresented in
the union sector. The combined impact of the contract compliance programmay then
be to substitute Hispanic males for black males inthe union sector,
Table 6 tests for such interactions betweenunionization and affxmative action
pressure and finds significantevidence of a negative interaction only for black males.
Black males' employment share increases 3.1 percentage pointsmore in unionized
non-contractors than in non-unionized non-contractors. Bycontrast, this share
increases by just 1.1 percentage points inunionized contractors compared to non-
unionized contractors. This is balanced by changes inthe employment of Hispanic
men, where there is a positiveinteraction between union and contractor status. In
the union sector, black males' share decreases by.004 among contractors, while
Hispanic males' share increases by .021.Affirmative action does not always and every-
where lead to increases in black employment, noris it intended to. These estimates
suggest that while Hispanic male employmenthas increased faster under affirmative
action in the contractor sector, black male employmenthas increased slower, if at all.
This may reflect to some degree the relative abundanceof black males in the union
sector, and correspondingly less affirmative action pressureto increase their share.
In 1974, 6.6 percent of all employees in the union sector wereblack males, compared
to only 4.9 percent in the non-union sector. While Hispanicmales were also relatively
abundant in the union sector, the proportionate disparity wasnot so great, .21 in the
union sectors compared to .19 in the non-union sector.A plausible explanation of the- 21-
observedinteractions is not in terms of theway Unions mediate affirmative action pre-
sures, but rather in terms of the different immediategoals toward which that pressure
is directed in the union sector14.Judged on the evidenceamong contractors, the
union sector appears more concernedwith increasing Hispanic maleemployment than
that of black males.
Section 6.Summaryand Conclusion
This paper has presented four mainfindings.
(1) Black males share of blue-collaremployment has increased faster in union
plants than in non-union plants in Californiamanufacturing between 1974 and 1980.
This indicates that the growth inunionization among blacks is not duesimply to
different regional or industry growth rates.We find a positive union effecteven when
industry, region, size, growth, and affirmative actionpressure are controlled for. This
suggests that the wide precedents set by Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 has
opened doors for blacks to express their preferencesin employment.
(2) While union seniority systems force thelayoff of low-tenure workers duringa
recession, the recessions of 1974 and 1979 did notharm minorities and femalesany
more in the union than the non-Unionsectors, judging on the basis of growth in
employment share between 1974 and 1980.
(3) Unionization has no significantimpact on blue-collar employment share of
other groups, with the exception ofa significantly negative impact on Hispanic
females. The notion that industrial unionsas a whole are any more or less discrimina-
tory is belied by the absence of significant effectsfor Hispanic males, black females,
and whites.
(4) There are significant differencesacross particular unions within industry and
region that correspond with each unionspublic record of EEO policy and practice.
Black male employment increases mostin industries with a long history of black
employment, in unions that take a liberal position towardsEEO, and in industries with- 22-
alarge union wage efcct. Craft type unions have a negative impact.
Changes in employment share among Hispanics, blacks,Asians, whites, and women
are a response to forces on both the supply ariddemand sides of the market. Union-
ized establishments in California manufacturing do not exhibit any morediscrimina-
tion than do non-union establishments against black or Hispanic men, or againstblack
or white women. Title VII appears to have beenefective in increasing employment
opportunities for blacks, allowing them to obtain the union jobs theyprefer.- 23-
Appendix.Data
Anew and detailed set of information at theestablishment level of disaggregation
was assembled for this study. EEO-i reportsdetailing establishment level demograph-
ics were matched for theyears 1974 and 1980 to produce a longitudinal file. All ofthe
data on establishment demographics,occupational structure, employment growth,
industry, location, and contractor statuscomes from this file. This was in turn
matched with OFCCP administrative recordsmade available by the OFCCP's Division of
Program Analysis to determine which establishmentshad undergone an affirmative
action compliance review. These reviewsessentially count only those performed by
the Department of Defense, andso are concentrated in the durable goods manufac-
turing industries. The characteristics of this EEOsample are discussed in greater
detail in other work. From this nationallongitudinal file, the 1273 establishments in
the manufacturing sector in California withmore than 100 employees were selected.
California, while interesting in its own right, alsoaccounted for 8.9 of all U.S.
manufacturing employment in 1977. For comparison, the 1977Census of Manufac-
tures counted 3278 Californiamanufacturing establishments with at least 100employ-
ees. Since all of these plants are required by law to fileIEEO forms, the undercount is
significant. Roughly half the EEO sample is lost in theconstruction of the longitudinal
file. A careful study of similarsample attrition by Ashenfelter and Beckmancon-
cluded that non-matches were largelyrandom. The remaining undercount isunex-
plained. While one might imagine that plants withpoor EEO records simply do not
report, this in itself should not bias our union/non-unioncomparison.
The union status of each of theseestablishments was determined byexamining
the 1982 collective bargaining contractcollection of the California State Department
of Industrial Relations. The Department hasmore than 3,400 private-sector agree-
ments on file, and makes intensive efTorts toobtain all contracts covering 50 ormore
employees. In 1982 this file included 1,364 contractsin the manufacturing sector,- 24-
covering450,310 employees. Since unions never achieve contracts in many plantsin
which they are certified as exclusive bargaining agents, only plantswith collective
bargaining agreements will be referred to as unionized in this paper.
The coverage of this file is extensive, especially for contracts covering morethan
50 employees. According to the US Department of Labor there were 2,001,000 employ-
ees in California manufacturing in 1980. (Employmentand Training Report of the
President, 1980, table d-2. p. 230). Applying the 1977 California averageof 35 percent
non-production workers in manufacturing yields 1,300,650 productionworkers. (U.S.
Census of Manufactures, 1977, Vol. III, Geographic Area Series-California,Part I, Table
2b, pp. 5-8.) In a pooled 1973-1975 CPS sample of 6022 private-sectorproduction
workers in California, Freeman and Medoff estimate the proportionunionized at .35,
close to the national average of .36. (Freeman and MedofT, 1979, p. 166,Table 4).
Nationally, Freeman and MedofT report that 49% of productionworkers in manufactur-
ing were union members. On this basis, wewould expect to find 637,320 union
members among production workers in California manufacturing.
88 percent of all employees covered by collective bargaining agreements covering
at least 100 workers in California manufacturing are subject to union shop ormodified
union shop security clauses. (California Department ofIndustrial Relations, 1982,
Table 1). So the contract file then includes about 396,000 unionmembers, or 62 per-
cent of the number we would expect to find by applying theFreeman-Me dofT estimates
of percent unionized to BLS totals. Part of this discrepancy maybe due to the strik-
ing decline in unionism in California. Union members as a proportionof all production
workers in California manufacturing dropped from .56 in 1975 to .42in 1979. (Califor-
nia Department of Industrial Relations, 1980, p.2, Table 1). If we adjustFreeman and
MedofT's 1973-1975 benchmark downwards by the same 25% to .37,then we would
expect 481,240 union members in California manufacturing.On this basis the con-
tract file includes 82% of all union members in California manufacturing.The- 25-
remainderare likely to be in establishments of lessthan 100 employees whichare
excluded from the study sample. Tothe extent that some unionizedestablishments
are still not identified as such, thismeasurement error will bias our resultsagainst
finding any difference between the unionand non-union sectors.- 26 -
NOTES
SeeBrown for a discussion of recent work in this area.
2.Of coursc, these clauses are carefully worded to comply bothwith the closed-shop
prohibition and with Title VII, but there is no law againstdiscriminating in favor of
friends of union members per se. Obviously, if it happensthat all these friends
are white males, Title VII comes into play.
3. Note that minorities and females can undercutthe union grievance system by
taking their case directly to the courts or theEEOC, as established in the case of
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, and this internal politicalconsideration
may influence unions' attitudes.
4. The law in this area is still developing, and was undergoingsignificant changes
during the period studied. Before 1977 the lowerfederal courts, most notably in
the case of Quarles v. Phillip-Morris, had judged seniority systemsthat per-
petuated the eects of past discrimination to be illegal,and these early decisions
may have influenced some of the companiesstudied here. The blunt edge of
these court decisions gave rise in a number of cases todifficult negotiations to
reassign seniority rights and redraw seniority units.(Ichniowski). While the EEOC
has argued that 703(h) should only apply to collectively bargainedseniority sys-
tems, one district court has recently extended it tonon-union cases. (EEOC vs.
E.I. duPont De Nemours & Co. [D. Del. 1978]).
5.Despite the increase in black male share in the unionsector, the percentage of
black males who are unionized in the study sample faIls slightlyfrom .72 in 1974
to .70 in 1980 because of the faster growth of total employmentin the non-union
sector. While the number of black males employed in the unionsector increased
by 17 percent, the number employed in the non-unionsector increased by 27
percent.27
6.On the other hand, with finercontrols we shall later see contrary evidenceshow-C
ing tipping.
7.Concerning the impact of affirmativeaction, in California manufacturing theprc
gram has significant impacts on blacks andon white males. Both female and male
black employment shares increasesignificantly faster in establishments thatare
federal contractors, and at establishmentsthat undergo a compliance review.
Although white males' share of totalblue-collar employment does increase
significantly at contractor establishments, theincrease in proportion to initial
1974 share is larger for black males, 19%compared to 14%, so black males' share
of male employment does increaseamong contractors. The observed pattern for
white males is not obviouslycompatible with an effective affirmative actionpro-
gram, and is anomalous in the sense that it is notgenerally observed in the econ-
omy as a whole. A possible explanation is that since theunion and defense con-
tractor sectors tend to be high-wagesectors, white males are relatively slower to
leave these sectors than others withinmanufacturing. The largest minority in
California, the Hispanics, have not beengreatly affected by affirmative action.
Their employment sharegrows slower at contractors and faster at reviewedcon-
tractors, but the effects are notsignificant. At the same time, white females
gained under affirmative action, but notsignificantly. Blacks may benefit by
being both small and vocal. It is more difficultto make room for a large protected
group, such as Hispanics or females, and thepressure to accommodate a quieter
group may not be great. Questions concerning theimpact of affirmative action
are the focus of a companionpaper.
8.The distribution of eachminority group in California is markedly different,and
provides useful test variation. Theseregressions include five SMSA dummies,
whose coefficients and selection reflectpopulation demographics. The areas are
the Los Angeles SMSA,containing 47 percent of the sample; the combined San- 28-
Diego,Anaheim, and Riverside SMSAs; the San Francisco SMSA, the SanJose SMSA,
all other Northern California counties, and all other SouthernCalifornia counties.
Reflecting their respective population concentrations,black employment share
increases faster in Los Angeles and San Francisco than elsewherein California.
Hispanic increases faster in Los-Angeles and San-Diego,and Asian increases fas-
ter in San Francisco and San Jose.
9.In this regard. there are two factors that may help explain theobserved pattern
for Hispanic males. First, compared to blacks, Hispanics are on average more
recent immigrants to California, and a large but unknown fraction arehere iiC
gaily. They may well be further back in line forunion jobs, and the illegals may
have greater trepidation and difficulty in obtaining employmentat the larger and
more formal union establishments. Second, moststudies of Hispanic-white earn-
ings ratios have found little evidence of discrimination once languageand educa-
tion are controlled for, (Reimers). If black males are attracted tounion shops by
the insulation from discrimination they enjoy under the umbrellaof union egali-
tarianism, it is possible that Hispanics may not feel as acute aneed for such pro-
tection, but this is doubtful. It helps to compare Hispanicswith blacks among
females. While unionization has had an insignificant positive impact onblack
females, Hispanic female employment grows significantlyslower in the union sec-
tor. This is more consistent with the view that Hispanics, as morerecent immi-
grants, are further back in the queue for union jobs.A more closely knit Hispanic
family cannot explain the difference in employment acrosssectors.
10. There are, of course, indirect paths such as the company that promotesfrom the
ranks, or that hires supervisors who match the race or sexof its production
workers, who we have found are more likely to be black inthe union sector.
Alternatively, this could come about through the clusteringof blacks in establish-
ments that already employ many blacks. Plants, like neighborhoods. may tip.In- 29-
fact,one of the major arguments in favor of affirmativeaction rests upon just
such externalities: the costs ofsearching for and obtaining a job are lower if
merribers of one's group are alreadyemployed at a given plant. Firms are
required to reach out to potential minority andfemale employees to counteract
such clustering among predominantwhite males. Leaving these indirect, but
potentially important, paths aside, we would notexpect the presence of a collec-
tive bargaining contractamong the production workers of a plant to haveany
impact on the demographic composition of thenon-production work-force.
11. These last two patterns for white-collarworkers are reversed among blue-collar
workers, although the coefficients in the lattercase are insignificant. This sign
reversal on the union efTect between white-collarand blue-collar workers sug-
gests that a simple omitted variable bias story is notlikely to explain the union
efTect on Hispanic males and white females.
12. Since SMSA is controlled for, this wouldrequire, for example, that the unionized
plants in Los Angeles be closer to Watts and otherconcentrations of black popula-
tion than are non-union plants. Since thesample of plants is longitudinal, this
cannot simply be due to the establishment ofnew plants in the suburbs after
1974. Also note that this within SMSAgeographic proximity cannot explain why
white-collar Hispanic males are moreheavily represented at union plants at the
same time relative gains for their blue-collar brothersare nowhere to be seen.
Moreover, while black male employment has increasedrelative to that of white
males in the union sector, no such efTectwas observed in Tables 3 among blue-
collar females. Unionisni is associated witha 5 percent greater employment
share for black females, which is less than the 9percent for white females. It is
also interesting to note that a pioneeringstudy of Chicago establishment demo-
graphics between 1967 and 1970 also found a positive unioneffect on growth of
black male share even aftercontrolling for distance from black residence area.- 30-
(Burman).To t' othe example, since two aridsometimesthree digit SIC
inductry is controlled for, along with the percentof craft workers among blue-
collar, arid the percent of clerical workers amongwhite-collar, this omitted vari-
able bias argument would require that theskill requirements of union plants
diner in very fine ways that favor blacks not onlyin blue-collar jobs, but also in
white-collar jobs, yet at the same time hinder Hispanicemployment. While possi-
ble, in my opinion these scenarios are unlikely.The question of geographic prox-
iruity is addressed in detail in a companion paper.In a sub-sample of Los Angeles
and Orange County establishments, the unioneflect on both white and blue-collar
workers persists even when distance from the ghettois controlled for. The sim-
plest explanation is that many of thewhite-collar workers in this sample are in
fact unionized, as fully 29 percent of allblack male managerial workers were
reported to be in 1967. (Ashenfelter, 1973).
13. Affirmative action might be successful in increasingblacks' share of hires, H, and
reducing their share of terminations, T, atunion establishments. But since these
establishments typically have lower turnover rates aand b than non-union estab-
lishments, the change in stockis expected to be lower, masking the impact of
affirmative action. Unionized plants are characterized byrelatively stable work
forces of long tenure. Unless long-tenure jobs arethemselves the product of an
intention to discriminate, which is unlikely, it is appropriateto judge affirmative
action in such stable industries by its impact onminorities' and females' share of
new hires and terminations rather thantheir share of employment. Since the
workforces turnover slowly, a positive change in flowshares will have to cumulate
for years before it has a significant efTect on employmentstock shares
14. Absent strong demonstration etTects, that pressureshould be most obvious in the
case of compliance reviews but here theinteractions terms are insignificant and
the evidence inconclusive.- 31-
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Table1: T-Tests of Changes inDemographic Proportions of Blue-CollarEmployment by Union Status. 1974-1980.
N=806 Non-Union and 467 UnionEstablishments
Demographic Union 1974 1980 Line Group StatusMeana Mean_— a Meani
MeanZ_—
1 Black N .049 .08.053 .07.003 28 2 Males Y .066 .07.077 .08.011 44 3 (3.8) (5.6) (2.7) (1.6)
4 Hispanic N .187 .19.255 .22.067 75 S Males Y .213 .18.263 .19.049 47 6 (2.4) (0.7) (2.5) (1.6)
7 Asian N .013 .02.030 .04.017 1.31 8 Males Y .014 .02.026 .03.012 L41 9 (0.6) (1.6) (2.2) (0.4)
10 White N .427 .27.332 .24—.098 —.18 11 Males Y .522 .23.428 .25—.093 —.13 12 (7.0) (6.2) (0.3) (1.1)
13 Black N .020 .10.026 .06.006 .68 14 Females Y .016 .03.023 .04.007 1.01 15 (1.9) (1.2) (0.4) (0.8)
16 Hispanic N .106 .15.142 .18.037 .68 17 Females Y .056 .05.075 .11.019 .92 18 (6.3) (7.4) (3.5) (2.0)
19 Asian N .016 .06.028 .01.013 1.67 20 Females Y .004 .02.009 .01.005 1.21 21 (59.7) (57.8) (7.8) (11.9)
22 White N .176 .20.129 .14—.046.17 23 Females Y .100 .13.091 .11 —.009.40 24 (7.3) (5.1) (5.9) (2.1)
25 Total N 197255 232316 35 .57 26 Y 381789 381774 0 .24 27 (6.1) (4.8) (2.1) (1.7)
Note: T-Tests across means inparentheses, on every third line. Inevery case, F-tests reject equality of variances across unionand non-union estab- lishments, with more than 99 confidence. The lastcolumn is th mean of per- centage changes, not the percentage of change inmeans, and is calculated- onlyfor those with positive initial share.
N =non-unionin 1982. Y union in 1982.- 34-




UNION .367 .48 =1if establishment was unionized
in 1982.
CONTRACT .724 .45 =1if establishment was part of a
contractor company in 1974.
REVIEW .186 .39 =1if establishment completed a
compliance review between 1974 and
1980 exclusive.
SIZE 264 527 Total number of blue-collar employees
in 1974.
GROWTH .450 3.20 Rate of growth of blue-collar
employment from 1974 to 1980.
SINGLE .280 .45 =1if establishment was not part of
a multi-establishment company.
PCRAFT .248 .31 Proportion or blue-collar employees
who are craftworkers.
PCLERK .295 .14 Proportion of white-collar employees












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 4: DIFFERENCES IN DEMOGRAPHIC CHANCES ACROSS UNIONS IN MANUFACTURING
N= 1273
DEMOGRAPHIC WHITE BLACK HISPANIC WHITE BLACK HISPANIC
GROUP MALES MALES MALES FEMALES FEMALES FEMALES
UNION N
.58 1.27 —.86 1.08 .13 —2.89
ALL 466 .025 .212 —.045 .104 .048 —.273
(.041) (.055) (.047) (.063) (.062) (.070)
A 25 1.42 2.81 4.11 —1.40 .60 —6.42
.061 .469 .215 —.135 .215 —.606
(.088) (.117) (.099) (.133) (.132) (.148)
B 43 5.27 2.04 —2.83 —3.06 —.42 —9.54
.227 .340 —.148 —.294 —.150 —.900
(.105) (.140) (.120) (.162) (.158) (.176)
C 57 1.93 2.27 —1.55 1.97 .50 —1.45
.083 .378 —.081 .189 .177 —.137
.076 (.100) (.086) (.116) (.113) (.127)
D 23 2.78 —1.87 —7.49 -.5.99 —.40 —1.40
.120 —.312 —.392 —.576 —.144 —.132
(.184) (.244) (.209) (.280) (.276) (.308)
E 2 19.49 —9.67 —6.78 1.44 —2.56 - —6.90
.841 —1,611 —.355 .138 —.913 —.651
(.593) (.788) (.674) (.905) (.893) (.994)
F 3 5.8 —9.60 —9.87 3.07 —5.10 —8.14
.250 —1.600 —.517 .295 —1.821 —.768
(.281) (.373) (.319) (.429) (.423) (.471)
Note: The first line is 100 (P/X) evaluated at mean P. The second is the
coefficient from the log—odds equation. The third is the standard error.
ALL is the average union effect from Table 3. The individual union effects
are estimated in the same sample with the same additional controls 1us
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































BETWEEN UNIONS AND AFFIR1IATIVE ACTION
P8O* .056
u=O
.080 —.004 .021 u1




Note:These equations are estimated in the same sample andwith the same additional
controls as Table 3. P80 is1980 share of blue—collar mp1oyment of given
demographicgroup.
62
.223
(.097)
—.16
—.058
(.171)
—.42
—.151
(.124)
—.006 —.022 .010
.009 .004 —.022
.011 .006 .008
.012 .002 —.002